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I. Introduction 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in the “Bridgegate”1 
controversy has been the subject of intense debate. It has 
received strong support.2 However, some critics assail the 
decision as representative of a pattern of recent cases in which 
the Court has shown itself as indifferent to political corruption, 
if not supportive of it.3 Somewhat lost in the discussion is the 
decision’s potential to be the foundation for a seismic 
re-alignment of anti-corruption enforcement in the United 
States. The current model—with federal prosecution as the 
norm—is not cast in stone.  
The facts of Bridgegate are well known. In 2015, associates 
of then Governor Chris Christie (Republican, New Jersey) 
executed a plan to alter access to the George Washington 
Bridge—the busiest motor bridge in the world. The plan 
involved reducing access lanes to the Bridge from Fort Lee, New 
Jersey. The result was gridlock and chaos in Fort Lee. The 
schemers wanted to punish the mayor of that town for not 
supporting the Governor’s re-election. The result was a disaster 
for them on many fronts.4 The United States Attorney for New 
 
 1. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). In this article, Kelly 
will refer to the actual decision, while Bridgegate will refer to the defendants’ 
conduct, and to the ensuing controversy. 
 2. See Randall D. Eliason, Opinion, On ‘Bridgegate,’ the Supreme Court 
Got It Right, WASH. POST (May 7, 2020, 8:54 PM), https://perma.cc/RR4V-
MS8S; Corinne Ramey, Was ‘Bridgegate’ Criminal, or Just Dirty Politics?, 
WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/4BPS-PPPC. 
 3. E.g., Elie Mystal, The Supreme Court Has Given Its Blessing to Public 
Corruption, THE NATION (May 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/P8SQ-NBYK; Leah 
Litman, Opinion, Prosecuting Political Corruption Cases Like Bridgegate Is 
Nearly Impossible, WASH. POST (May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/4FFE-CHRE 
[hereinafter Litman Op-Ed]; Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s “Bridgegate” 
Decision Leaves a Big Hole in America’s Anti-Corruption Laws, VOX  (May 7, 
2020, 12:50 PM), https://perma.cc/XP6Q-6LPU.  
 4. They lost their jobs (two of them resigned). Christie was not directly 
implicated, but his public image suffered. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The 9 Things 
You Need to Know About Bridgegate, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://
perma.cc/K5E7-5UBB  (“And while he has not been implicated in any 
wrongdoing, Christie’s approval rating in New Jersey continues to drop to this 
day—so much so that his 2016 presidential aspirations seem pretty dim.”). 
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Jersey prosecuted them for violation of federal fraud statutes.5 
Their convictions were upheld at both the district and appellate 
court level.6 In May of 2020, however, a unanimous Supreme 
Court reversed, vacating the convictions.7 
 Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court analyzed the 
concept of fraud as embodied in the relevant statutes. She 
reasoned that they required that the defendants have obtained 
money and property from the owner of the Bridge: the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey.8 She viewed the lane 
realignment as a regulatory decision that did not involve the 
required gain or loss of property. The defendants had lied to Port 
Authority employees and the public to facilitate the scheme. 
Their conduct may have been fraudulent, even “corrupt,” but it 
did not constitute a violation of federal law.9  
 Early criticisms have not focused much on the fine points 
of the decision such as the proprietary/regulation distinction, or 
the question of whether and to what extent private gain is 
required in such cases. Instead, they have attacked the decision 
as part of the Roberts Court’s softness on corruption.10 They rely 
heavily on campaign finance decisions such as Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission,11 as well as the body of 
Supreme Court decisions on ordinary corruption. The issue of 
 
 5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1343 (2018). The charges included substantive 
violations and conspiracy to violate. There was also an allegation of violation 
of the Criminal Civil Rights statute, Id. § 242. 
 6. See United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 558–60 (3d Cir. 2018); 
United States. v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW-1, 2017 WL 1233892, at *1 
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2017).  
 7. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (vacating and remanding). 
 8. See id. at 1568–69. 
 9. See id. at 1568 (“The evidence the jury heard no doubt shows 
wrongdoing—deception, corruption, abuse of power. But the federal fraud 
statutes at issue do not criminalize all such conduct.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Litman Op-Ed, supra note 3; c.f. Zephyr Teachout 
(@ZephyrTeachout), TWITTER (May 7, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/A8M2-
28PJ [hereinafter Teachout tweet] (“The case still fits within a pattern of the 
Court striking down key prosecutorial tools in the anticorruption fight but it 
was a relatively novel theory being used, and I think the real impact on 
prosecutions will be less than other cases.”). 
 11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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whether to analyze these decisions together is important.12 
Citizens United played no role in Kelly v. United States.13 It 
should not escape even the casual observer that the first group 
of cases have been split along ideological lines, while the second 
group are almost always unanimous. It is virtually 
inconceivable that the liberal justices would abandon their 
position on how to deal with corruption in one set of cases but 
not the other. The notion of a monolithic Roberts Court 
approach to all issues of corruption seems simplistic. 
 Focus on the Roberts Court’s purported general approach 
to corruption may lead to insufficient attention to a specific 
aspect of Justice Kagan’s opinion: the emphasis on federalism 
as a driving force behind the result. It is true that in other 
corruption decisions favoring the defendant, the Court has often 
invoked federalism.14 However, the concept is much more 
central in Kelly. The American model of anti-corruption 
enforcement has long been debated.15 Under the present model, 
the federal government plays the lead role in combating state 
and local corruption, particularly in high profile cases.16 This 
division of authority is not inevitable. After Kelly, a 
re-alignment seems possible. States have statutes on point and 
mechanisms to enforce them.17 Moreover, reconsideration of the 
federal role would come at a time when the allocation of 
 
 12. See, e.g., Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand, 
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1619, 1626–27 (2017); see generally Joshua S. Sellers, 
Contributions, Bribes, and the Convergence of Political and Criminal 
Corruption, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 657 (2018). 
 13. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). 
 14. E.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–61 (1987). 
 15. Compare Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution 
of State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 144 (2003),) with Geraldine S. 
Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch 
Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 207–08 (1994). 
 16. These cases set the tone for the entire field.  
 17. For example, the New Jersey statute on “unauthorized exercise of 
official functions,” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2016), was cited in Kelly, 
140 S. Ct. at 1571. The Louisiana laws on video poker licenses were cited by 
the Court in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000) (citing LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 27:301–:324 (West Supp. 2000)). And many states have ethics 
commissions. See generally COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS, https://
perma.cc/4G4U-59NM; State Ethics Commissions: Jurisdiction, NAT’L CONF. 
ON ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/PNP7-8Y2J. 
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responsibilities between the two levels of government seems up 
for grabs, with frequent calls for greater state responsibility. 
From partisan gerrymandering to immigration to police reform, 
there are stirrings of a “new federalism.” After Kelly, one must 
consider what a new anti-corruption federalism might look like. 
 Section I of the article sets out the legal context and the 
alarming facts of Bridgegate. Section II examines the 
Bridgegate legal saga from the indictment through the decision 
in the lower courts. Although its outcome almost always favored 
the prosecution, the shape of the case changed considerably 
during its journey to the Supreme Court, an indication, perhaps, 
of its difficulty. Section III examines the High Court's decision 
in Kelly. It considers both the Court's approach to the concept of 
fraud in the relevant statutes, and its emphasis on federalism 
concerns in construing them. Section IV weighs possible impacts 
of Kelly, both on future prosecutions under the existing model, 
and on that model itself. It revisits the criticisms of the Roberts 
Court, and contends that the unified vision of the Court’s 
approach to corruption breaks down when one examines 
differing legal contexts and doctrines. The First Amendment 
plays a dominant role in campaign finance matters, but is 
largely absent from ordinary corruption cases. Federalism has 
nothing to do with campaign finance. It has a lot to do with 
anti-corruption enforcement. 
II. Bridgegate: Alarming Facts and Uncertain Legal Context 
A. The Facts: “Time for Some Traffic Problems in Fort Lee.” 
In his 2013 re-election campaign, Republican New Jersey 
Governor Chris Christie sought the endorsement of multiple 
Democratic mayors of New Jersey towns to show bi-partisan 
support. He deployed his Deputy Chief of Staff, Bridget Kelly, 
to court the mayors for their endorsement, including the Mayor 
of Fort Lee, Mark Sokolich.18 Mayor Sokolich declined to 
endorse Christie that summer.  
Since Fort Lee connects New Jersey to New York via the 
George Washington Bridge, Kelly reached out to William 
 
 18. This recital of the facts is drawn from the decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the Third Circuit. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568–71; United States v. 
Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 558–60 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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Baroni, the Deputy Executive Director of the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey and the highest ranking New Jersey 
official in the bi-state agency, and David Wildstein, who 
functioned as Baroni’s chief of staff, for suggestions on how to 
respond. As a result of a decades old political agreement, three 
of the twelve toll booth lanes on the Bridge’s upper level feed 
from local Fort Lee traffic, while the remaining nine lanes feed 
from various highways. Wildstein suggested that removing the 
dedicated Fort Lee lanes would cause rush hour traffic to back 
up for hours on local streets, creating a gridlock. The plan was 
later revised to allocate only one lane to Fort Lee traffic. Kelly 
agreed in a now famous email: “Time for some traffic problems 
in Fort Lee.” Kelly followed up in a phone call that she wanted 
to “‘creat[e] a traffic jam that would punish Mayor Sokolich and 
‘send him a message.’” Baroni, using his power as the Deputy 
Director, gave the sign-off approving the plan. The prosecution 
framed this as obtaining property; the defense claimed it was a 
use of regulatory power. 
Baroni did not have the power to reallocate the lanes 
arbitrarily. To put the plan in motion, Kelly, Baroni, and 
Wildstein created a cover story that “the lane change was part 
of a traffic study, intended to assess whether to retain the 
dedicated Fort Lee lanes in the future.”  
In order to effectuate the scheme, Kelly, Baroni, and 
Wildstein agreed to incur the cost of extra toll collectors. On 
September 9, 2013, the plan went into effect on the first day of 
school, without warning or advance notice to Mayor Sokolich or 
Executive Director of the Port Authority, Patrick Foye. The 
town of Fort Lee was engulfed in gridlock, with chaos and traffic 
rivaling September 11, 2001. Mayor Sokolich’s repeated 
attempts to reach Baroni were met with radio silence, which 
was part of the schemers’ communication plan. The realignment 
scheme lasted five days.  
The public backlash was “swift and severe.”19 Port 
Authority staff were asked to testify before the New Jersey 
State Assembly. In the following months, Wildstein and Baroni 
resigned and Governor Christie fired Kelly. On April 23, 2015, 
a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging 
defendants with violations of federal law. While Governor 
 
 19. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1571. 
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Christie won re-election, his national reputation never 
recovered. 
B. The Legal Context 
1. Views of Corruption 
 The conduct outlined above certainly qualifies as 
bare-knuckle politics.20 But two key questions arise: is it 
corruption; and, is it the type of corruption reached by federal 
law? A narrow view of corruption focuses on private gain though 
public office. As Jacob Eisler puts it, “[t]he law of corruption 
identifies when public officials betray their office for the sake of 
self-enrichment.”21 However, his analysis points to a broader 
framework:  
Corruption is . . . intimately related to positive duties of 
government. Corruption can be understood as deviation from 
political integrity (itself informed by deep concepts such as 
sovereign legitimacy and the right to use the collective power of the 
state), and a particular corrupt act can be understood as the 
violation of a political duty.22 
Professor Teachout sees the debate over the meaning of 
“corruption” in a similar way. “Corruption, in the American 
tradition, does not just include blatant bribes and theft from the 
public till, but encompasses many situations when politicians 
and public institutions serve private interests at the public’s 
expense.”23 
 Was Bridgegate corruption? Not surprisingly, both Eisler 
and Teachout reject a narrow, quid pro quo approach to 
corruption.24 As they discuss, there are sharp divisions over the 
 
 20. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059), 2019 
WL 4568203.  
 21. Eisler, supra note 12, at 1627. 
 22. Id. “The Court has committed to a particular theory of democracy that 
refuses to impose the expectation that the public good should be the politicians’ 
primary concern.” Id. at 1642. At a certain level of generality, Eisler’s critique 
can be applied to both campaign finance issues and ordinary corruption. The 
question about how closely they are related is discussed below. 
 23. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 2 (2014). 
 24. See id. at 12; Eisler, supra note 12, at 1629. 
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meaning of corruption.25 Bridgegate shows how the divisions 
play out. If one focuses on using office for personal gain, the 
conduct can be seen as hardball politics, but not more. The 
political gain from harming the mayor does not seem to fit 
within the classical narrow concept. Certainly, it is hard to see 
a quid pro quo. Under a broader concept, however, Bridgegate 
may be condemned as corrupt. Eisler favors a “civic approach” 
based on the “expectation that the public good should be the 
politician’s primary concern.”26 Bridgegate seems antithetical to 
any such approach. Eisler discusses the concept of “institutional 
corruption.”27 “Institutional corruption occurs when the duties 
of public officers are abused not for explicitly private gain, but 
in order to yield prohibited benefit (which does not accrue to the 
official’s personal welfare).”28 Practices such as logrolling and 
patronage are examples of other conduct that fit the broader 
context. In sum, under one perspective, Bridgegate can certainly 
be viewed as corruption. 
2. Federal Law 
 Does this corruption violate federal law? It must be noted 
at the outset that there is no general federal code of 
anti-corruption law governing state and local government 
officials. Nonetheless, anti-corruption prosecutions are an 
important function of the Justice Department acting through 
individual United States Attorneys.29 These prosecutions are 
brought under a series of individual statutes that, taken 
together, might be viewed as constituting a form of code. They 
cover mainly extortion,30 bribery,31 and mail and wire fraud.32 
None of these statutes leaps to mind in considering Bridgegate. 
At various times there has existed a federal crime of deprivation 
 
 25. This debate is largely animated by Supreme Court decisions which 
will be discussed infra Part III. 
 26. Eisler, supra note 12, at 1642. 
 27. Id. at 1630. 
 28. Id. at 1630–31 (discussing theories of Dennis Thompson). 
 29. See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 106–07 (7th ed. 2020).  
 30. 18 U.S.C § 1951 (2018). 
 31. Id. §§ 666, 1346. 
 32. Id. §§ 1341, 1343. 
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of the right to honest services.33 Lower courts developed this 
right by broadly construing the nature of “fraud” to include the 
right to honest services. McNally v. United States34 brought the 
doctrine to a halt. There is a background issue of separation of 
powers in McNally, but the decision is best known for its 
invocation of federalism. The Court warned against “the Federal 
Government . . . setting standards of disclosure and good 
government for local and state officials.”35 Congress overruled 
McNally, and reinstated the honest services doctrine as within 
the reach of fraud statutes.36 Bridgegate would have fit nicely 
within it.37 However, the Supreme Court in Skilling v. United 
States38 subsequently narrowed the scope of the doctrine to 
bribery and kickbacks.39 The Court relied heavily on the 
vagueness doctrine, and also cited McNally.40 The Court was, 
once again, using approaches to statutory construction in order 
to keep the federal judiciary from becoming an arbiter of good 
government within the states. But these approaches were, in 
part, based on the Constitution. Vagueness is one example. 
However, a conceivable reading of Skilling is that development 
of a criminally enforceable right to honest services is beyond the 
power of the federal courts or the Congress.  
 Were these developments a rejection of a broad view of 
corruption, or just statutory construction?41 Not surprisingly, 
defendants’ amici in Kelly portrayed the prosecution as an 
attempt to reintroduce honest services through the back door.42 
 
 33. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 347–51. 
 34. 483 U.S. 350, 358–61 (1987). 
 35. Id. at 360.  
 36. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 350–51. 
 37. See generally Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing examples of the doctrine). 
 38. 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 39. See id. at 408–09 (“To preserve the statute without transgressing 
constitutional limitations, we now hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the 
bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.”). 
 40. See id. at 402 (citing McNally, 483 U.S. at 360). 
 41. Cf. TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 195–99 (praising lower courts’ 
adoption of doctrine because of its breadth). 
 42. See generally Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 
1565 (2020) (No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 4729854. 
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Amici with the same perspective had played an influential role 
in McDonnell v. United States.43 There, the defendant governor 
set up meetings and performed other minor favors for a 
would-be state contractor who had given him gifts. He was 
convicted of bribery. However, the Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected the notion that he had performed “official acts” on 
behalf of the donor, a requirement of the statutes at issue.44 In 
sum, on the eve of Bridgegate, one could read Supreme Court 
doctrine as fundamentally hostile to honest services notions of 
corruption, or constrained by the vagueness doctrine to reject it. 
III. The Bridgegate Prosecution and the Saga in the Lower 
Federal Courts 
A. The Indictment and the Successful Prosecution 
 The unusual facts of Bridgegate presented the United 
States Attorney for New Jersey with a dilemma. On the one 
hand, the conduct looked corrupt—definitional niceties aside. 
On the other hand, an honest services theory was not available. 
Thus, he had to fall back on the array of statutes cited above, or 
find another source of federal criminal law. Yet, many of the 
criminal statutes rest on some form of quid pro quo, which 
Bridgegate did not present. He obtained an indictment that 
charged violation (and conspiracy to violate) of three federal 
statutes: the Federal Program Bribery Statute,45 the Wire 
Fraud Statute,46 and the Criminal Civil Rights Statute.47 
 The essence of the three statutory theories is as follows. 
The Federal Program Bribery Statute—generally known as 
§ 666—applies to officials of an entity that receives federal 
 
 43. See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
Ironically, former Governor McDonnell himself joined in an amicus brief in 
Kelly. See generally Brief for Amici Curiae Lord Conrad Black and Former 
Governor Robert F. McDonnell in Support of Petitioner, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 
(No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 1275301. 
 44. The concept of “official acts” derives from the definition of bribery in 
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 
 45. Id. § 666; Indictment at 1–29, United States v. Baroni, 2017 WL 
1233892 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2017) (No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW-1), https://perma.cc
/BVB7-4SMG (PDF). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Indictment, supra note 45, at 29–35.  
 47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; Indictment, supra note 45, at 33–36. 
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funding in certain instances, forbidding acts of bribery by such 
officials.48 In addition, any such official violates the statute if he 
or she “embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without 
authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other 
than the official owner or intentionally misapplies, property (of 
a certain description).”49 The prosecutor argued that property 
could either be tangible or intangible, and that payments to 
employees—and control of the bridge — qualified. 
 The wire fraud statute provides in part that “[w]hoever, 
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses . . . or promises [utilizes electronic 
means]” shall be punished.50 Again, the prosecutor’s argument 
was that the indictment sufficiently alleged “obtaining” 
intangible property.51  
 The Criminal Civil Rights Statutes have not been widely 
used in the anti-corruption context.52 The key statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242, makes it a crime for a person acting under color of law to 
“willfully subject any person in any State, Territory . . . to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”53 
The statute was arguably applicable because the defendants 
had deprived Fort Lee residents of their constitutionally based 
right to intrastate travel. The indictment survived a motion to 
dismiss; the jury convicted on all counts. However, the judicial 
saga had only begun. In particular, the prosecution had to worry 
about the defense’s general claim that the indictment allowed a 
 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
 49. Id. § 666(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. § 1343 (emphasis added). 
 51. See United States v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW, 2016 WL 
3388302, at *8 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016). 
 52. See George Brown, New Federalism’s Unanswered Question: Who 
Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 417, 490–91 (2003) (discussing use of criminal civil rights 
statutes). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018). 
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back-door version of an honest services prosecution to sneak in 
through the property theories.54 
B. The District Court Opinion: Ignoring the Supreme Court? 
 The lower court opinions are discussed at some length 
because their differences illustrate the extensive flexibility of 
the two major federal statutes involved.55 In denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for acquittal and for 
a new trial, Federal District Judge Susan Wiggenton delivered 
opinions that endorsed a broad federal role in combating state 
and local corruption.56 Indeed, she seemed to ignore virtually 
everything the Supreme Court has been saying since McNally. 
 Her main focus was on the meaning of “misapplies” in 
§ 666.57 She read the statute as the equivalent of an honest 
services provision. It refers to “any improper use of property, 
whether or not for personal gain.”58 She noted that under Third 
Circuit Model Jury Instructions misapplication “includes the 
wrongful use of the money or property for an unauthorized 
 
 54. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Ms. Kelly’s 
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in Its Entirety at 33, Baroni, 2016 WL 
3388302 (No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW), 2016 WL 1579981 
Like Cicco, Ms. Kelly’s argument is bolstered by the fact that had 
Congress intended § 666 to cover the conduct here, it would not 
have needed to enact the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, 
four years later. Section 1346 was enacted in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally, which held that § 1341 was 
not intended to protect intangible rights, only property rights. 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Congress made clear 
in § 1346 that it intended to include a ‘scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible rights to honest services,’ which had been 
interpreted, pre-Skilling, to cover just about any abuse of office by 
a public official or employee. 
 55. Professor Torres-Spelliscy also discusses the two lower court 
opinions. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Elegy for Anti-Corruption Law: How the 
Bridgegate Case Could Crush Corruption Prosecutions and Boost Liars, 69 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1689, 1698–1700 (2020). 
 56. See United States v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW, 2017 WL 
787122 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2017) (denying defendants’ motions for judgments of 
acquittal and motions for a new trial); Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302 (denying 
defendants’ motions to dismiss). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) (2018); see Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at 
*3 – 6. 
 58. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *5. 
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purpose.”59 She rejected the defendants’ vagueness argument on 
the ground that the statute is “broad, but not unclear.”60 The 
wire fraud convictions were upheld on the ground that “the 
object of the alleged scheme or artifice to defraud must be a 
traditionally recognized property right.”61 This could include 
tangible property such as employee salaries as well as 
intangible property. The court also upheld the civil rights 
convictions.62  
 This is an extraordinary decision. It turns the 
misapplication prohibition of § 666 into something close to a 
general honest services statute. The jurisdictional trigger is 
receipt by a jurisdiction of $10,000 in federal funds.63 Virtually 
all state and local governments are covered. However, the 
misapplication applies to all property whether acquired by 
federal funds or not. Early arguments over § 666 focused on 
whether it applies this sweepingly.64 The similarity in the 
district court’s analysis to notions of honest services is striking. 
It refers to “root[ing] out public corruption”65 and to motives like 
 
 59. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 6.18.666A1A-3 (2017), https://perma.cc/9UL6-Y7GP (PDF)). 
 60. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *3 (citing the ruling on the motion to 
dismiss indictments discussed supra note 56). She noted that even the 
Supreme Court had described it as having “plain and unambiguous ‘meaning’ 
and ‘expansive unqualified language,’” Id. at *3–4 (citing Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52, 52, 57 (1997)). Salinas was decided 13 years before 
Skilling accepted a vagueness argument in the “honest services” context. 
 61. Id. at *6. 
 62. See id. at *7–8. They were upheld on the ground that the right to 
intrastate travel is sufficiently established. The court described at length the 
defendants’ “illegitimate purpose of harming Fort Lee residents,” although it 
had earlier stated that motive “is not an essential element of any of the crimes 
charged.” Compare id. at *2, with id. at *7. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2018). In addition, the transaction at issue must 
have a value of $5,000 or more. Id. 
 64. In Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court 
held by implication that it does. The core rationale was that Congress wants 
officials who handle its grants of money to be faithful servants of the public 
trust, lest their unfaithfulness extends to the federal moneys. See id. at 
605 – 06. 
 65. Baroni, 2017 WL 787122, at *4 (citing United States v. Willis, 844 
F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
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“improper” or “wrongful use of property.”66 Whether regulatory 
actions are a form of property is not addressed.  
 The decision would gladden the heart of anyone who 
criticizes the Supreme Court for softness on corruption. It shows 
a conception of the judicial role in this field similar to that 
imagined by Professor Teachout: courts resolve corruption 
issues, far beyond the boundaries of quid pro quo.67 Is the 
district court ignoring the Supreme Court? Judge Wiggenton 
was able to cite to the Court’s decision in Salinas v. United 
States68 for the view that this statute is to be broadly 
construed.69 Section 666 is presented by the district court as a 
statute written for a broad purpose with language that is “broad 
but not unclear.”70 Defendants are apparently on notice as to the 
purpose of the statute as well as its text and court decisions 
interpreting it.71 
 It is hard to reconcile this reasoning with the Supreme 
Court’s general approach to vagueness.72 More importantly, it is 
hard to reconcile the district court’s approach with the Court’s 
repeated reluctance to involve the federal judiciary in devising 
codes of conduct for state and local government.73 The district 
court disposes of federalism in a footnote.74 Another footnote 
distinguishes honest services rights from intangible property 
rights by stating that the two are different.75 The 
criminalization of politics argument is also discussed summarily 
 
 66. United States v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW, 2016 WL 3388302, 
at *5 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016). The wire fraud portion of the opinion is also 
broad.  
 67. See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 23 , at 231–34. 
 68. 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
 69. See Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *4 (citing Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57). 
 70. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *4. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 529–30 (2015) (narrow 
construction of the word “object”); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859– 60  
(2014) (narrow construction of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-856 (1999) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.)). 
 73. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). 
 74. See Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *9, n.10. 
 75. See id. at *9, n.15. 
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in a footnote.76 Had the case stopped here, the district court’s 
opinion and decision would have stood as a sharp alternative to 
what the Supreme Court has been doing and saying about the 
federal anti-corruption enterprise. 
C. The Third Circuit: Closer to the Supreme Court? 
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
corruption convictions, but in a way that hewed somewhat more 
closely to the Supreme Court’s overall view of the issue.77 The 
court did uphold the wire fraud convictions. The two key points 
reiterated the lower court’s analysis: property under the statute 
can be intangible as well as tangible;78 and wages of Port 
Authority personnel needed to carry out the scheme constitute 
“a form of intangible property.”79 
 The most important part of the decision is its narrowing 
of § 666. The Third Circuit was able to uphold that part of the 
convictions under a much narrower theory than the district 
court’s. The suggestion that “misapplication” might be stretched 
to equal an honest services statute was put to rest. The objective 
language of § 666 covers an official who “embezzles, steals, 
obtains by fraud, . . . or intentionally misapplies” property of the 
entity receiving federal funds.80 The circuit court read the verbs 
as similar, all parts of a theft-like offense.81 Misapplication is to 
be read narrowly, limiting § 666 to “theft, extortion, bribery, and 
 
 76. See id. at *4. 
 77. See generally United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2018). 
The Court rejected the constitutional argument based on a right to intrastate 
travel. Id. at 585–89. 
 78. See id. at 564. The Third Circuit says that the property prong is met 
by the intangible property of employee time and labor, as well as the Port 
Authority’s “unquestionable property interest in the bridge’s exclusive 
operation, including the allocation of traffic through its lanes and of the public 
employee resources necessary to keep vehicles moving.” Id. at 567.  
 79. Id. at 565. The court did not decide the argument that the “right to 
control” the bridge is a form of intangible property, but it indicated agreement 
with it. Id. at 566–67. The Court of Appeals had no difficulty in fitting the wire 
fraud counts within existing Supreme Court decisions. 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1) (2018). 
 81. See Baroni, 909 F.3d at 570–76. 
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similar corrupt acts.”82 The court could then apply its wire fraud 
analysis of property to a case where the defendants 
“fraudulently obtained, knowingly converted, or intentionally 
misapplied the labor of Port Authority employees. . . .”83 
 The defendants argued that acting with a prohibited 
interest would now constitute fraud if any government revenue 
were used to make or effectuate the decision.84 The court flipped 
the argument on its head by arguing that there could never be 
“simple mail fraud or wire fraud” because “obtaining” would 
always constitute dishonest services.85 Defendants attempted to 
turn the § 666 debate into one about the criminalization of 
politics. They argued the case amounted to a discretionary 
allocation of public resources in the normal course of operations, 
based on political concerns.86 The court stuck to its guns. Any 
political dimensions concerned the defendants’ motive, which 
was not an element of the offense.87 Even though § 666 was 
aimed at preserving the “integrity”88 of recipients of federal 
assistance, it did so by focusing on “offenses involving fraud and 
theft. . . .”89 The court also considered a vagueness challenge to 
the trial court’s use of “unjustifiable or wrongful” to define 
misapplication.90 The court responded that “[j]urors are 
regularly trusted to understand the meaning of these ordinary 
words in criminal cases.”91 
 Both lower courts to a degree aimed their opinions at the 
Supreme Court’s general approach to anti-corruption cases, 
 
 82. Id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 
2007)). 
 83. Baroni, 909 F.3d at 574. 
 84. See id. at 568. 
 85. Id. at 569. 
 86. See id. at 571. 
 87. Overall, the court presented a defensible reason for treating this case 
as property fraud rather than honest services. The Third Circuit’s treatment 
of federalism is less satisfactory. The court dealt with it by ruling that the Port 
Authority is “an interstate agency created by Congressional consent,” and that 
it “receives substantial federal funding.” Id. at 569. This would suggest that 
the decision is law only for the Authority and entities like it. 
 88. United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 573 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 676, 678 (2000)). 
 89. Id. at 572. 
 90. Id. at 582. 
 91. Id. at 583. 
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although the district court seemed more concerned with evading 
it rather than following it. They realized that Bridgegate had 
substantial political overtones, and that the defendants were 
relying heavily on the Court’s aversion to an honest services, 
good government approach to the application of federal criminal 
law to corruption cases. The district court dealt with the end run 
argument, but only in a footnote.92 The circuit court squelched 
the district court’s apparent attempt to achieve a form of honest 
services through a broad reading of “misapplies” in § 666.93 Two 
aspects of the lower court opinions seem odd, given that the 
judges knew their handiwork was likely to face sharp scrutiny 
in the Supreme Court. The first is the treatment of vagueness 
as an easy question. If “honest” is an uncertain term,94 why 
cannot the same be said of “misapply,” “wrongful” and 
“unjustifiable?” Perhaps the Third Circuit made this problem go 
away by reading “misapplication” as referring to a property 
offense like theft or fraud. More serious was the cursory 
treatment of federalism. The district court dealt with it in a brief 
footnote. The Third Circuit finessed it by focusing on the 
interstate nature of the Port Authority.  
IV. Bridgegate in the Supreme Court: the Decision, the 
Reaction, and the Implications for the Future of Federal 
Anti-Corruption Law 
A. The Decision: Kelly v. United States 
 At oral argument, the Supreme Court seemed puzzled 
over whether the case involved good government or property.95 
Justice Breyer questioned whether the issue was good 
governance or property fraud. Justice Kagan’s analysis in the 
actual opinion came down squarely on the latter side: “The 
 
 92. Id. at 568 (“Defendants were charged with simple money and 
property fraud under Section 1343—not honest services fraud—and the grand 
jury alleged an actual money and property loss to the Port Authority.”). 
 93. Id. at 574. 
 94. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 422 (2010). 
 95. See, for example, pages 32 to 36 of the Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020) (No. 18-1059), https://perma.cc
/P3CK-3QA7 (PDF), in which Justice Breyer questions whether the issue is 
good governance or property fraud. 
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question presented is whether the defendants committed 
property fraud.”96 Thus the case would seem to turn on whether 
the Third Circuit was right in finding an “obtaining” of property 
such as employee labor. 
 The Court apparently accepted the treatment of § 666 as 
coextensive with the wire fraud statutes.97 This implicitly 
ratifies the narrowing of a potentially broad statute. The 
opinion also sounded a strong federalism note by quoting the 
McNally passage that federal courts are not to “set standards of 
disclosure and good government for local and state officials.”98 
The Court repeated the theme that this limit is found in the 
fraud statutes themselves, but it is clear that a broader, 
constitutional imperative of federalism underlies this 
construction. Congress’ attempt to enact an honest services law 
has, in part, been limited by the Court on vagueness grounds.99 
But, federalism concerns play a role in vagueness. The two 
classic justifications for the vagueness doctrine are the need to 
give citizens guidance and the need to prevent prosecutors from 
exercising unchecked power.100 In corruption cases, that power 
is exercised by federal prosecutors on state and local officials, 
but we know that the federal government should not “use the 
criminal law to enforce (its view of) integrity in broad swaths of 
state and local policymaking.”101 
 This federalism-based approach did not mean the Third 
Circuit was wrong in focusing on property. For the Supreme 
Court, the problem was that the defendants’ scheme was not 
“directed at the [Port Authority’s] property.”102 The court below 
seemed trapped by the dilemma that every act of 
maladministration can be recast as property fraud because 
property can be found in the picture somewhere. The Supreme 
Court escaped the dilemma by utilizing a different distinction. 
 
 96. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568.  
 97. See id. at 1571. 
 98. Id. (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)). 
 99. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 405, 410. 
 100. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 
(1972). 
 101. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 
12, 24 (2000)). 
 102. Id. at 1572 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 44, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 
(No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 6324152). 
DEFENDING BRIDGEGATE  159 
 
The lane realignment was “a quintessential exercise of 
regulatory power.”103 A regulatory choice is an example of 
sovereign authority, not of government’s role as property 
holder.104 This distinction may often not be easy to make. The 
Court drew heavily on Cleveland v. United States,105 which 
involved a fraudulent attempt to secure video poker licenses. 
Certainly money was involved in administering the regulatory 
scheme.106 The action in Bridgegate was a classic exercise of 
sovereign power. The Court accepted that some property, such 
as paid employee labor, was involved, but viewed it as incidental 
to the scheme to redirect the lanes.107 
 One might accuse the Court of a somewhat old-fashioned 
view of property as essentially a thing rather than as a set of 
rights and duties. However, the Court is correct that “[m]uch of 
governance involves (as it did here) regulatory choice.”108 Using 
the fraud statutes widely to affect that governance would 
seriously upset federalism values. Controlling state and local 
governance presents the same question of ultimate sovereignty 
as does “commandeering” them.109 
B. The Reaction: More Roberts Court Encouragement of 
Corruption? 
 In this subsection, I will discuss negative reactions to 
Kelly, and place them in the larger context of the 
“pro-corruption” critique of the Roberts Court.  
 Professor Torres-Spelliscy correctly viewed the oral 
argument as portending a win for defendants.110 She criticized 
the likely decision as an example of “the ever-escalating right to 
 
 103. Id. at 1572. 
 104. Id. at 1574. 
 105. 531 U.S. 12 (2000). 
 106. See id. at 15. The unused licenses had monetary value, but that value 
was derivative of the regulatory freedom they conferred. 
 107. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1573–74 (2020). 
 108. Id. at 1574. 
 109. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“Federal 
commandeering of state governments is . . . a novel phenomenon.”). 
 110. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Will the Supreme Court Let the Bridgegate 
Defendants Get Away with Lying?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/57SB-J54V.  
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lie and the ever-shrinking definition of corruption.”111 The 
notion of the Court as advancing a right to lie is a recurrent 
theme of her writing.112 Presumably, this right’s principal base 
is the Constitution.113 Whatever one thinks of this perspective, 
a “right to lie” played little if any role in Justice Kagan’s opinion 
for a unanimous Court. Her point was that what the defendants 
did was not an “obtaining”; it was a “run-of-the-mine exercise of 
regulatory power . . . .”114 The fact that they lied to help the 
scheme did not change its nature. Lying is irrelevant, and 
certainly not a “right” enumerated in Justice Kagan’s opinion.115 
 As for corruption, Professor Torres-Spelliscy has criticized 
the Roberts Court for encouraging it. “Politicians who have been 
charged with serious allegations of political corruption are using 
the Supreme Court’s rebranding of corruption, including its lax 
interpretation of what counts as corruption from both campaign 
finance and criminal cases, to their legal advantage.”116 Like 
Professor Teachout, Professor Torres-Spelliscy relies heavily on 
campaign finance decisions such as Citizens United117 as 
influencing and reflecting the Court’s view of what might be 
called “ordinary corruption.”118 There are a number of excellent 
analyses explaining the relationship and differences between 
the two fields.119 Both can present questions of how 
representative government works, and more general issues of 
public-private interactions and the problem of private influence 
on public officials. However, the automatic equating of the two 
seems superficial. Elections almost always involve a flow of 
 
 111. Id. For other writings of Professor Torres-Spelliscy on Bridgegate, see 
supra note 55 and accompanying text; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The Supreme 
Court Considers Political Lies in the Bridgegate Case, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(Oct. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/R2S5-SZZF.  
 112. See, e.g., CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, POLITICAL BRANDS 32–38 (2019). 
 113. See id. at 34–37. 
 114. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572–73. 
 115. Id. at 1572. Justice Kagan stated that “[b]ecause the scheme here did 
not aim to obtain money or property, Baroni and Kelly could not have violated 
the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws.” Id. at 1574. 
 116. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 112, at 5. 
 117. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 118. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 112, at 41–43; TEACHOUT, supra 
note 23, at 7–12. 
 119. See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 12; Sellers, supra note 12. 
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private money.120 Elected politicians campaign to the electorate 
by appealing to one side over the other. However, the principles 
of administration of the law—even by elected officials—start 
with a presumption of neutrality, and view the flowing of things 
of value to officials with great suspicion.121 I concede that there 
is not a wall of separation. As Professor Torres-Spelliscy points 
out, one can find echoes of Citizens United (campaign finance) 
in McDonnell (ordinary corruption).122 Indeed, as she notes, 
ordinary corruption defendants may cite Citizens United in 
support of a loose view of the political process.123  
A more fundamental critique of the positions of Professors 
Torres-Spelliscy and Teachout is that they do not have much to 
say about federalism. A central theme in the ongoing debate 
over combating corruption has been the relative roles of the 
federal and state governments. The debate has been robust, 
particularly in academia. In a landmark article, Professor Peter 
Henning pointed out the advantages of federal prosecution.124 
He contended for example that “[c]orruption is not a matter 
solely of state concern, reserved for the police powers of the 
states, but is instead a national concern that falls within the 
interests of the federal government.”125 Proponents of this view 
have cited the political problem of state politicians prosecuting 
their colleagues—who may, in the case of governors, have 
appointed them126—and the federal government's superior 
 
 120. Except for public campaign financing. 
 121. The Supreme Court’s statement about the “impartial execution of the 
laws” demonstrates these principles. See Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l. Ass’n. of 
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973). 
 122. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 112, at 60. 
 123. See id. at 60–62; see also George Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption 
Enterprise After McDonnell—Lessons from the Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 989, 990–98 (2017) (citing the role of amici in McDonnell).  
 124. See Henning, supra note 15, at 144. 
 125. Id. at 86. “Federalism protects states, and thereby individuals, from 
oppression by the national government, but it does not permit public authority 
to be exercised corruptly, harming both the state and its citizenry by 
insulating non-federal officials from federal criminal prosecution.” Id.  
 126. For example, Christopher Porrino, who served as Governor Christie’s 
Chief Counsel during the Bridegate scandal, was nominated and confirmed as 
the state’s Attorney General two years after. Matt Arco, Christie Nominates 
His Former Chief Counsel as N.J. Attorney General, NJ.COM (June 16, 2016), 
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resources. The contrary view focuses on the existence of state 
laws and the widespread use by state ethics commissions, as 
well as traditional prosecution mechanisms.127 States, it is 
argued, cannot fix their enforcement problems if they are never 
given a chance in the important cases.128 
Professor Torres-Spelliscy, of course, wrote before Kelly, 
and cannot be blamed for failing to discuss the extensive 
federalism underpinnings of the decision. However, cases such 
as McNally and McDonnell had certainly shown the Court’s 
concern for federalism in allocating prosecutorial roles. The 
most prominent critic of the actual decision is Professor Leah 
Litman.129 Writing in The Washington Post shortly after the 
decision, she opined that Kelly had made it “almost impossible” 
to prosecute corrupt politicians.130 Professor Litman repeats 
many of the standard criticisms of the Roberts Court. There is 
for example, the reliance on Citizens United as a key step in the 
pro-corruption direction. McDonnell is cited as an example of 
the Court’s laissez-faire attitude toward the subject. Professor 
 
https://perma.cc/Q8F2-F25R (last updated Jan. 16, 2019). In Massachusetts, 
there has been uncertainty over the roles of the Attorney General’s office and 
the State Ethics Commission in handling a state police scandal. See Andrea 
Estes, DA, Ex-Head of State Police Probably Violated the Law by Ordering 
Arrest Report Altered, Panel Says, BOS. GLOBE, https://perma.cc/PUR4-TRK7 
(last updated June 24, 2020). Such issues can take on a partisan dimension. 
See Press Release, Massachusetts Republican Party, AG Healy: Rule of Law 
Doesn’t Matter If You’re a Fellow Democrat (June 25, 2020), https://perma.cc
/8JTF-DPR7.  
 127. See Richard Messick, Law Profs: Stop the Overheated Rhetoric About 
Bridgegate, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc
/H9WQ-PGY7. 
 128. See generally Moohr, supra note 15; see also George D. Brown, Carte 
Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 403, 413 (2005) (discussing the views of Professor Roderick M. Hills, 
Jr., that different levels of government have distinct political values, and 
“these prosecutions could impose on non-federal governments federal 
conflict-of-interest rules that are fundamentally inconsistent with the style of 
democracy that flourishes at the non-federal level” (quoting Roderick M. Hills, 
Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions 
Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 113, 114 (2005))). 
 129. See Litman Op-ed, supra note 3; see also Leah Litman, The Supreme 
Court Says Sorry, It Just Can’t Help With Political Corruption, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/S9G9-D932. 
 130. Litman Op-ed, supra note 3. 
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Litman does not really analyze Kelly. There is nothing about 
federalism.  
There is, however, a strong element of partisanship. After 
citing Citizens United, Professor Litman notes that “[i]n other 
decisions that divided the Court along ideological lines, 
GOP-appointed justices invalidated laws designed to combat 
public corruption.”131 But this is a good example of overreliance 
on campaign finance law to analyze ordinary corruption. Kelly 
is the latest in a line of cases that have been decided 
unanimously, including McDonnell, Skilling, and Cleveland. 
Some of the opinions have been written by liberal, 
Democratic-appointed justices,132 including Kelly itself. It was 
Justice Kagan who wrote that “not every corrupt act by state or 
local officials is a crime.”133 Of such language Professor Litman 
writes that “we have shielded officials from accountability and 
made public corruption inevitable.”134 Along with the 
partisanship, one finds some guilt by association. We learn from 
Professor Litman that the law firm of Jones Day represented 
both Governor McDonnell and the Bridgegate defendants, and 
that it had “previously done some legal work for the 
President.”135 
Some of the analysis seems naive. Professor Litman 
complains that juries are likely to favor officials in corruption 
cases.136 This will come as news to former Governor 
McDonnell,137 former New York Speaker Silver,138 and former 
New York Senate Majority Leader Skelos.139 It also flies in the 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. For instance, Justice Ginsburg authored the Cleveland decision. See 
generally Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000). 
 133. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020). 
 134. Litman Op-ed, supra note 3. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. (“Public officials may command more respect and receive more 
indulgence than the average criminal defendant from jurors, who often 
interpret conflicting evvidence in their favor.”). 
 137. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 138. See Benjamin Weiser, Sheldon Silver Is Convicted in 2nd Corruption 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/T5NM-VXW4. 
 139. Vivian Wang, Guilty, Again: Dean Skelos, Former Senate Leader, Is 
Convicted of Corruption in Retrial, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), https://perma.cc
/A6KN-K9EZ. 
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face of common sense, as well as academic research, suggesting 
unfavorable public opinion toward possibly corrupt officials.140 
At times, Professor Litman seems unfamiliar with the material. 
After discussing McNally, she writes that “Congress has never 
amended the mail fraud statute to 
prohibit . . . pernicious . . . public corruption . . . .” like that in 
McNally.141 Congress did essentially that a year after McNally 
when it enacted the Honest Services Statute.142 A 
section-by-section analysis of the broader statute of which it was 
a part states that it “overturns the decision in McNally v. United 
States in which the Supreme Court held that the mail and wire 
fraud statutes protect property but not intangible rights.”143 I 
would not go so far as to call Professor Litman’s article “plain 
nonsense.”144 However, if it is the best critics of the Court can 
do, the current, federalism-based attitude towards corruption 
seems in little danger. 
The article did spark a useful debate in the pages of the 
Global Anticorruption Blog.145 Richard Messick points out that 
the Court’s lenient attitude toward corruption has not 
prevented a high level of prosecutions.146 He also rejects the 
ideological critique, noting that the Court has generally been 
unanimous in this area.147 Indeed Justices Ginsburg and Kagan 
 
 140. See generally Christopher Robertson et al., The Appearance and the 
Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 375 (Dec. 1, 2016). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7603, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018) 
(“[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”). 
 143. 134 CONG. REC. S17,360 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Biden). 
 144. See Messick, supra note 127 (stating that Professor Litman’s claim 
that the Court’s pattern in corruption cases makes it “‘almost impossible to 
put a crooked politician in jail.’ . . . is plain nonsense.” (quoting Litman Op-Ed, 
supra note 3)).  
 145. See id.; see also Matthew Stephenson, The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Opinion in the “Bridgegate” Case: Some Quick Reactions, GLOBAL 
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 12, 2020) https://perma.cc/6ZRD-LFGY.  
 146. See Messick, supra note 127. 
 147. See Messick, supra note 127 (“That the decision was unanimous and 
written by a member of the Court’s liberal wing are two of several clues in the 
Court’s opinion showing it is no part of a Trump-inspired plot to legalize public 
corruption.”). 
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have written three opinions for a unanimous court.148 It is hard 
to imagine the liberal, Democratic-appointed justices being 
prominent parts of a sinister attempt to enshrine corruption. 
There were dissenters in McNally, but it was Republican 
appointees who dissented.149 
Messick also defends an emphasis on federalism in 
anti-corruption enforcement.150 This central element of Kelly is 
all but ignored by critics of the Court’s “leniency.” There is a real 
debate about this issue, but, for example Professor Teachout 
does not discuss it in her book Corruption in America.151 The 
critics’ automatic assumption is that the federal government is 
the primary, if not the sole, locus of preventing state and local 
corruption. As Messick points out, states have their own 
enforcement mechanisms.152  
Messick’s colleague, Professor Matthew Stephenson, 
defends Professor Litman by arguing that state performance is 
uneven.153 Professor Stephenson takes the nationalist side in 
the debate discussed above. He contends that aggressive federal 
enforcement remains necessary.154 The question whether states 
 
 148. See generally Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020); Skilling 
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 
(2000).  
 149. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362–77 (1987) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting, joined in part by O’Connor, J.). 
 150. See Messick, supra note 127 
Professor Litman would have readers believe that federal 
prosecutors are the only ones protecting citizens from corrupt, venal 
state and local leaders. That is of course not true. All states, and 
many cities and counties, have their own prosecutors. All but three 
states have state-level ethics commissions; many cities . . . have one 
as well, and if all these agencies can’t hold corruption in check, 
there is always the ballot box. 
 151. She does discuss state anti-bribery efforts in the nineteenth century. 
See TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 113–19. 
 152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Stephenson, supra note 145 (“[R]eliance on state law is 
problematic, particularly in settings w[h]ere state prosecutors, and perhaps 
state judges as well, are part of the same political machine as the corrupt 
officials. There’s a reason that . . . federal prosecutors . . . have played a 
central role in cleaning up state and local corruption.”). 
 154. See id. Messick agrees as to anti-bribery laws. See Messick, supra 
note 127 (“I don’t disagree that historically aggressive federal enforcement of 
the antibribery laws have been an important check on elected politicians and 
their political machines.”). 
166 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 141 (2020) 
 
can police their own is at the heart of that debate. The cursory 
conclusion that they can’t deserves further exploring. Take 
Bridgegate, for example. New Jersey has a statute aimed at 
maladministration.155 But the Governor appoints the Attorney 
General. Would public opinion have forced him to act? Would 
state legal processes have led to some device such as 
appointment of a special prosecutor? We don’t know. Certainly 
New Jersey’s political processes played a strong role. The 
conspirators lost their jobs.156 Governor Christie’s state and 
national standing was seriously damaged.157 
In subsequent blog posts, Messick criticizes the role of the 
other federal branches in the enactment and enforcement of the 
broad anti-corruption laws.158 He contends that “[t]hose 
genuinely interested in fighting corruption need to stop 
denouncing the Court and focus their energies instead on [the 
other] two branches of government.”159 I think this is 
analytically sound, but unlikely to happen. No one will lose their 
academic standing for criticizing the Roberts Court, especially 
if it can be labeled pro-corruption and linked to the Trump 
administration. Messick is certainly right in calling for scrutiny 
of United States Attorneys. They are important political actors 
in their states, even if largely unaccountable.160 Messick points 
 
 155. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2020). 
 156. See Kelly, 140 S.Ct. at 1571 (“The fallout from the scheme was swift 
and severe. Baroni, Kelly, and Wildstein all lost their jobs.”). 
 157. See generally Amber Phillips, The Bridgegate Trial Is Over. So Is 
Chris Christie’s Political Career, Probably, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2016), https://
perma.cc/5DZF-MUKD. I concede that the ultimately unsuccessful federal 
prosecution may have played a role in these developments, although I question 
whether that is the function of the U.S. Attorney. 
 158. See Richard Messick, Where the Real Blame for Letting Bridgegate 
Defendants Off Lies: Part I, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 20, 2020) 
https://perma.cc/8PH5-SDLV [hereinafter Real Blame Part I]; Richard 
Messick, Where the Real Blame for Letting Bridgegate Defendants Off Lies: 
Part II—the Congress, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 3, 2020), https://
perma.cc/PQ63-RT97. 
 159. Real Blame Part I, supra note 158. 
 160. See Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? 
McDonnell Fails to Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecutions of State 
Officials, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 189, 216 (2016), https://perma.cc/3FP3-
LWZN (PDF) (“The central question is whether we want a system where 
federal prosecutors can act—with what comes close to a blank check—to 
regulate state and local politics.”). 
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to the problem of the United States Attorney who seeks 
recognition through highly visible corruption prosecutions.161 
Neither level of government is perfect. There is plenty of room 
for federalism debates on this subject in the future. 
Federalism aside, Messick introduces another 
constitutional reason for questioning the extraordinary reach of 
U.S. Attorneys: the Due Process Clause as embodied in the 
vagueness doctrine.162 His focus is on the second value invoked 
for the doctrine: reining in enforcement authorities.163 Thus, he 
seems to point to an ideal world in which the federal government 
would define its role more narrowly, and the states would 
assume a larger one.  
C. The Impact of Bridgegate 
1. Practical Implications 
 The principal criticism of Kelly is that in its result and 
larger context, it makes federal prosecutions of corruption more 
difficult, if not virtually impossible.164 The criticism has been 
leveled before. A good example is the reaction to McDonnell.165 
In that case, a governor had accepted gifts from a person who 
wished to do business with the state. The governor arranged a 
number of introductions and, in general, showed support for the 
donor’s product. There was no showing of pressure to buy it. 
Under the relevant federal statute, the question was whether 
 
 161. See Messick, supra note 127. 
I am afraid the chance to bring a high-profile corruption [charge] 
too often brings into play career factors that blind some to the rule 
of law issues. Rudy Giuliani’s decision while U.S. Attorney to 
personally prosecute the Queens borough chief after wrest[l]ing the 
case away from local prosecutors could serve as exhibit one. 
 162. Real Blame Part I, supra note 158. 
 163. See generally Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1204–08 (2009) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1972) (“Where the list of crimes is so 
all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted may 
be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority . . . .”). 
 164. See Litman Op-Ed, supra note 3. 
 165. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
168 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 141 (2020) 
 
the governor had performed “official acts.”166 A unanimous 
Supreme Court vacated his conviction, reversing the two lower 
courts that had upheld it.167 The Court reasoned that the 
governor had not taken official action to help the donor.168 What 
he had done fell within the general category of responsiveness 
to constituents.169 The Court’s analysis of responsiveness in a 
democratic system seemed analogous to language in Citizens 
United. Critics and defense lawyers pounced on the decision. For 
the former, it was an example of the complacent attitude 
towards corruption discussed above. They saw it as calling into 
question a large range of bribery convictions, present and 
future. The lawyers began to use the case to attack existing 
prosecutions. They enjoyed initial success. However, the 
McDonnell boomlet fizzled. Federal courts found it 
distinguishable, and routinely upheld convictions where it was 
invoked.170 The tendency in bribery cases appears to be for 
prosecutors to present enough evidence of a relation to an 
“official action” to satisfy McDonnell. 
 
 166. See id. at 2361 (“To convict the McDonnells of bribery, the 
Government was required to show that Governor McDonnell committed (or 
agreed to commit) an ‘official act’ in exchange for the loans and gifts.”). The 
honest services bribery statute, as it stands after Skilling, sends interpreters 
to 18 U.S.C. § 201, which includes the requirement of “official acts.” See 18 
U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (“[T]he term ‘official act’ means any decision or action on 
any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controvery, which may at any 
time be pending, or which may by be brought before any public official, in such 
official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”). 
 167. See United States v. McDonnell, No: 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 166390 (Dec. 1, 2014), aff’d 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d 136 S. 
Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 168. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 169. See id. at 2372 (“[C]onscientious public officials arrange meetings for 
constitutents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in 
events all the time. The basic compact underlying representative government 
assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act 
appropriately on their concerns . . . .”). 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 660 F. App’x 4, 7 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2016) (rejecting the argument raised by Stevenson appealing to McDonnell); 
see also, e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 805 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing post-McDonnell developments). Of 
course, the converse can happen. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) 
(providing an example of Supreme Court precedent that considerably opened 
the door to increased anti-corruption prosecutions, at least initially). 
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 Kelly involves a different statute, but critics have already 
labeled it as part of a pattern making it “almost impossible to 
put a crooked politician in prison.”171 A question post-Kelly will 
be how much official conduct is now shielded from mail and wire 
fraud as an “exercise of sovereign power.”172 If the exercise 
results in, or has as its object, personal gain, a court might hold 
that any obtaining of property is not incidental. Then it would 
be reachable if the case involved fraud and use of the mail or 
wires. A frequent hypo in the various stages of the case involved 
a mayor directing how snow is to be plowed.173 Apparently, if 
she directs the crews to begin with neighborhoods that support 
her politically, that is an exercise of sovereign power. If, 
however, she directs that her own home be plowed first, that is 
an example of personal gain, and thus an obtaining of 
property.174 
 Such lines may be hard to draw. Conceptually, she derives 
gain from seeing her supporters rewarded. Courts will face a 
number of fine distinctions. The problem stems from the fact 
that exercises of sovereign power often necessarily involve 
municipal property. The city owns the snowplows, and the 
wages paid to the driver can be viewed as property.175 For 
line-drawing purposes, the Kelly Court postulated a distinction 
between scheming to influence a regulatory choice and a scheme 
to defraud the government of its property.176 Drawing on 
Cleveland, the Court treated as fundamental the difference 
 
 171. Litman Op-Ed, supra note 3. 
 172. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020) (“The defendant’s 
fraud ‘implicate[d] the Government’s role as sovereign’ wielding ‘traditional 
police powers’—note its role ‘as property holder’” (quoting Cleveland v. United 
States, 531 U.S. 12, 23–24 (2000))). 
 173. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, 36–40, Kelly v. United 
States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020) (No. 18-1059), https://perma.cc/P3CK-3QA7 
(PDF). 
 174. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565. For 
general discussions of such problems, see Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1573–74; 
(describing fact scenarios sufficient to raise a loss of property to the 
government used in a scheme to defraud); Baroni, 909 F.3d at 571 (discussing 
the snowplower example). 
 175. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572 (“By contrast, a scheme to usurp a public 
employee’s paid time is one to take the government’s property.”). 
 176. See id. (“And this Court has already held that a scheme to alter such 
a regulatory choice is not one to appropriate the government’s property.”). 
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between “property and regulatory power.” However, this 
formulation may not help much in a case where both are 
present. As further guidance, the Court’s analysis suggests two 
questions: whether any property loss or use is “only an 
incidental byproduct of the scheme,”177 and whether the 
scheme’s “object . . . was to obtain the [government]’s money or 
property.”178 
 It seems likely that use of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes will not be seriously curtailed by the decision.179 Basic 
fraud like embezzling money will clearly be covered.180 Where 
Kelly may have an effect is cases at the margin—when the role 
of any property is not significant—and cases that look like 
attempts to restore an honest services doctrine. More generally, 
it will be interesting to see if lower courts (finally) get the 
message that the Supreme Court wants them to approach 
federal anti-corruption prosecutions of state and local officials 
more cautiously. 
2. Theoretical Dimensions of Bridgegate 
 Unlike some of the earlier decisions, Kelly does not rely on 
such statutory construction doctrines as vagueness181 or the rule 
of lenity.182 Two closely related concerns play a major role in the 
 
 177. Id. at 1572. “Or put differently, a property fraud conviction cannot 
stand when the loss to the victim is only an incidental byproduct of the 
scheme.” Id. (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 23 (2000)). 
 178. Id. at 1568. 
 179. See Teachout tweet, supra note 10. 
 180. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1573 (providing an example of outright 
embezzlement as constituting property fraud (citing Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349, 357 (2005))). 
 181. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010) (“In 
proscribing fraudulent deprivations of ‘the intangible right of honest services,’ 
Congress intended at least to reach schemes to defraud involving bribes and 
kickbacks. Construing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core 
meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal.” (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346 (2018))). 
 182. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000) (“[T]o the 
extent that the word ‘property’ is ambiguous as placed in § 1341, we have 
instructed that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.’” (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 
(1971))). United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. is a well-known 
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Kelly decision: (1) the desire to avoid turning a broad federal 
statute into an honest services mandate; and, (2) general 
principles of federalism. The rise and fall of the honest services 
doctrine has been frequently detailed.183 The focus here is on 
what has been animating the Court’s insistence that no such 
doctrine can be derived from the mail and wire fraud statutes. 
McNally’s disapproval of involving “the federal government in 
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local 
and state officials”184 has been repeated and paraphrased in 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions curbing the federal role in 
prosecuting ordinary corruption.185 McNally itself might be 
explained in separation of powers terms. The notion of an 
intangible right to honest public services, federally mandated by 
the fraud statutes, began in the lower courts.186 It lasted for 
forty years as a sort of federal common law of corruption.187 One 
can question whether this is a proper role for the courts. Richard 
Messick puts forward a different separation of powers 
argument: unbounded freedom to dictate what is good 
government vests too much power in federal prosecutors.188 
Justice Scalia raised this issue in his influential dissent from 
the denial of certiorari in Sorich.189  
 
example of strict statutory construction in the anti-corruption context. See 
generally 526 U.S. 398 (1999). The Court read the federal anti-gratuities 
statute narrowly. Professor Teachout, however, sees it as something more, 
reflecting a "deep logic of politics . . ." and encouraging the use of money to 
purchase influence. TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 228–29. 
 183. E.g., ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 347–50. 
 184. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360. 
 185. E.g., Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571 (2020); McDonnell 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 20. 
 186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 187. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 139–44 (2d. Cir. 1982) 
(Winter, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
 188. See Messick, supra note 127. 
 189. See Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1206 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
Without some coherent limiting principle to define what ‘the 
intangible right of honest services’ is, whence it derives, and how it 
is violated, this expansive phrase invites abuse by 
headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state 
legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of 
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct. 
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After Kelly, the question arises whether there will be a 
resurgence of the critique of the federal role and how far it might 
extend. Messick argues federal intervention is proper in cases of 
bribery.190 This raises the old question of what sort of cases 
warrant federal intervention.191 But suppose the argument for a 
limit is constitutionally based, and points to no intervention. If 
state and local governance is protected from federal 
commandeering,192 why doesn’t the protection extend to 
oversight of how that governance is exercised? On the other 
hand, is it significant that the Kelly Court did not discuss more 
general principles of constitutional federalism as discussed and 
debated in cases such as Printz v. United States, United States 
v. Lopez and Younger v. Harris?193 
Much of the problem stems from the fact that the 
Constitution does not contain a general anti-corruption clause 
granting Congress the power to deal with the issue. Professor 
Kurland has argued that the Guarantee Clause194 is a clear 
constitutional foundation for the anti-corruption enterprise and 
acts as a grant of power to enact appropriate statutes.195 This 
argument has force, but does not seem to have attracted wide 
support. Professor Teachout finds in the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause,196 an anti-corruption imperative for the whole 
 
 190. E.g., Messick, supra note 158. 
 191. E.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do 
Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy, 6 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 113, 138 (2005). 
 192. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997). 
 193. See id.; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575–83 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). It 
may be that the field of corruption should not be seen as one which is largely 
forbidden to Congress because of principles of federalism. Instead, those 
principles drive the Court to an exceedingly grudging and narrow reading of 
the statutes that purport to criminalize corruption. 
 194. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 195. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal 
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 415–70 (1989) 
(articulating the argument for the Guarantee Clause’s basis for federal 
jurisdiction for anti-corruption measures). 
 196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of 
Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress accept 
of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any 
King, Prince, or foreign State.”). 
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country.197 While one can perhaps extract a hortatory message, 
it is hard to see the clause as a grant of power to Congress to 
deal with state and local corruption. 
How is it, then, that virtually every week sees a prominent 
state or local official in the federal dock on corruption charges? 
As noted earlier, an array of federal statutes reach, or have been 
construed to reach, corrupt activity. Congress' power to enact 
them derives from specific authority granted in the 
Constitution, for example, the Commerce Clause, the Postal 
Power, or the Spending Power.198 The Hobbs Act, for example, 
punishes extortion, defined as the obtaining of property from 
another “with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force . . . or under color of official right.”199 “[C]olor 
of official right” sounds like it might extend to corrupt 
politicians, but where does Congress get the power to 
criminalize such obtaining in the first place? The answer is that 
the perpetrator must be someone who “in any way or degree 
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any 
or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion . . . .”200 The 
Act is in some tension with notions of federalism that the Court 
developed in different contexts.201 True, the statutory language 
is broad, and the Court has said that it is to be broadly 
construed.202 However, the federalism concerns that have 
recently become dominant might cause the Court to tighten up 
interpretation. Lower courts may be seen to have gone too far in 
holding that “an actual impact on commerce is sufficient if it is 
small or even ‘de minimis.’”203 
 
 197. See TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 26–28 (discussing adoption of Clause 
and the Framers’ intent). Professor Henning had sounded many of the same 
notes in his landmark article. See Henning, supra note 15, at 83–89 
(discussing anti-corruption legacy of the Constitution). 
 198. See ABRAMS, supra note 29, 21–30. 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2018). 
 200. Id. § 1951(a). 
 201. See Henning, supra note 15, at 76–84 (arguing that notions of a 
separate state sphere do not apply to fighting corruption). 
 202. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (“Th[e Hobbs] 
Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the 
constitutional power Congress has to punish interference ‘in any way or 
degree.’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018))).  
 203. ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 316.  
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Jurisdictional elements like those in the Hobbs Act are 
potential targets for reducing the reach of federal statutes used 
to pursue corruption. There is, of course, the question whether 
they measure the federal interest better than substantive 
elements. Either way, we are back to identifying when federal 
intervention is justified. Federalism post-Kelly may play a 
bigger role in answering that question. The issue is not limited 
to the Hobbs Act. The mail and wire fraud statutes require that 
these means of communication be a part of the scheme to 
defraud “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.”204 
Supreme Court decisions have taken a broad approach to this 
requirement.205 Again, emphasis on federalism might lead to a 
different approach. Recently, the First Circuit found this 
element lacking in a complex patronage scheme. It involved fake 
examinations, in cases where the successful applicant had 
already been chosen. Unsuccessful candidates received letters 
informing them of the results. The circuit court held the mailing 
was not an essential part of the scheme.206  
Section 666—a fraud statute not tied to the Commerce 
Clause—was enacted pursuant to the Spending Power, and is 
triggered by a jurisdiction's receipt of a certain amount of 
federal funds.207 Congress' purpose was to protect federal funds. 
However, the Supreme Court has allowed its application to 
activity in the funded entity not connected to federal funds. Here 
too, an emphasis on federalism could lead the Court to a 
different result.208 Apart from specific statutes, general 
 
 204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018).  
 205. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (“To 
be part of the execution of the fraud, however, the use of the mails need not be 
an essential element of the scheme. It is sufficient for the mailing to be 
‘incident to an essential part of the scheme,’ or ‘a step in [the] plot . . . .” (citing 
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954))); Badders v. United States, 240 
U.S. 391, 394 (1916))); ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 347–51. 
 206. United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 207. 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
 208. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the broad scope of the 
statute did not justify the broad interest in prosecuting the instance of 
corruption). 
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statements of “Principles of Federal Prosecution” might be 
narrowed.209 
 It is possible that such questions will remain academic, in 
the pejorative sense of the word. Still, federalism is always on 
the table, and we live in an era when states are flexing their 
muscles in areas as diverse as epidemic control, immigration, 
and police reform.210 Intergovernmental relations are 
undergoing extraordinary change in many areas, why not here? 
V. Conclusion 
In a term that featured blockbuster decisions and banner 
headlines,211 Bridgegate flew under the radar. However, the 
decision is of potentially great significance. The narrow 
holding's reach is far from clear.212 The theoretical implications 
could be sweeping. The Court repeatedly invoked federalism, 
sending a message to lower courts and prosecutors to the effect 
of “we really mean it.” Two implications stand out. The first, 
albeit implicit, is that the Court sees ordinary corruption as 
sometimes presenting different problems from campaign 
finance. In Kelly itself, the Court did not cite Citizens United in 
the opinion; it was not mentioned in oral argument and neither 
party cited it in their brief.213 Some critics seem to posit a 
 
 209. See ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 235 (discussing the role of such 
principles).  
 210. See generally, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration 
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Nicole St. Clair Knobloch, Opinion, 
Governors Can Lead the Way on Climate Too, BOS. GLOBE (May 9, 2020, 1:08 
PM), https://perma.cc/JLJ4-9495. 
 211. See, e.g., President is Not ‘Above the Law,” Justices Decides, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/FKG4-7S9X (PDF); Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court Rules Trump Cannot Block Release of Financial Records, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/564X-H2EV (last updated July 10, 
2020). 
 212. See Teachout tweet, supra note 10. Teachout continues to criticize the 
holding. 
 213. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse in amicus supporting the government 
cited it multiple times. Brief for Amicus Curiae Senator Sheldon Whitehouse 
in Support of Respondent, United States of America at 17 n.6, Kelly, 140 U.S. 
1565 (No. 18-1059). Whitehouse’s main point appears to be that Citizens 
United, “caused democratic safeguards to rot from within, and it left the 
People with less voice, less power, and more cynical than ever.” Id. at 17–18. 
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monolithic Roberts Court view of corruption in all contexts.214 
However, a categorical view may go too far; a more nuanced 
approach is called for. There are, no doubt, as Eisler points 
out,215 similarities between campaign finance and ordinary 
corruption decisions. Outcomes in each area may reflect the 
Court's underlying view of governance. At some level, one can 
perhaps draw useful comparisons, but the level is an extremely 
high one. For example, there are reasons why campaign finance 
cases often split five-to-four, while Kelly was unanimous. 
Campaign finance cases are dominated by First Amendment 
issues and questions of the nature of corruption. Federalism 
plays no role. In ordinary cases federalism—and potentially 
related issues such as vagueness—are dominant, especially if 
state and local officials are involved. This fact leads to the 
second implication. Decisions such as Kelly could give 
substantial impetus to a rethinking of the American 
anti-corruption model which places United States Attorneys at 
the forefront of prosecutions of state and local corruption. It is 
admittedly difficult to visualize how this rethinking would play 
out, and what results it would yield.216 For example, would the 
federal role simply come to an end? This is doubtful. On the 
other hand, there are plenty of opportunities to narrow it. The 
extent to which federalism is a significant constitutional 
 
 214. See TEACHOUT, supra note 23, 9–10, 244–45; see also Ciara 
Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating Corruption, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 505 
(2019) (“Politicians who have been charged with serious allegations of political 
corruption are using the Supreme Court’s reduction of what counts as 
corruption from both the campaign finance and the criminal cases to their 
legal advantage.”). 
 215. See Eisler, supra note 12, at 1626 (“Though the doctrinal questions 
may differ, the shared issue of representative obligation means a failure to 
reconcile the treatment of governance between campaign finance law and 
official corruption law will inevitably create tensions.”). 
 216. Professor Eisler suggests that 
State (and local) anti-corruption law designed along civic lines may 
offer a more promising possibility [than the Court's approach]. Such 
laws could adopt the broad drafting and flexible enforcement 
necessary to robustly encourage public-mindnedness, with the 
additional benefit of greater intimacy between state government 
and their smaller, geographically compact constituencies. While 
there would be variance between state laws, this would reflect local 
norms and enable “laboratories of democracy.” 
Eisler, supra note 12, at 1688 (citations omitted). 
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principle or a canon of construction is an important question. 
Kelly leads to this kind of questioning and rethinking. For this 
reason, it should be celebrated, rather than denigrated as some 
bastard offspring of Citizens United.217 
 
 217. Kelly is helpful in pondering these issues, raised by scholars such as 
Professors Eisler and Hills. Although I have generally leaned toward the 
federalism position, I admit that I have at times found the nationalist 
approach appealing, particularly the idea of the national government as the 
beacon of civic integrity for the entire country. In recent years, this approach 
has somewhat lost its luster. 
